svcadm(8)을 검색하려면 섹션에서 8 을 선택하고, 맨 페이지 이름에 svcadm을 입력하고 검색을 누른다.
ssh(1)
(SSH client) is a program for logging into a remote machine and
for executing commands on a remote machine. It is intended to
provide secure encrypted communications between two untrusted
hosts over an insecure network. X11 connections, arbitrary TCP
ports and sockets can also be forwarded over the secure channel.
connects and logs into the specified which may be specified as
either or a URI of the form The user must prove their identity to
the remote machine using one of several methods (see below). If
a is specified, it will be executed on the remote host instead of
a login shell. A complete command line may be specified as or it
may have additional arguments. If supplied, the arguments will
be appended to the command, separated by spaces, before it is
sent to the server to be executed. If ssh links with FIPS-capa‐
ble OpenSSL, ssh runs in FIPS-140 mode. In FIPS-140 mode non-
FIPS approved ciphers, MACs and digests are disabled. The op‐
tions are as follows: Forces to use IPv4 addresses only. Forces
to use IPv6 addresses only. Enables forwarding of connections
from an authentication agent such as This can also be specified
on a per-host basis in a configuration file. Agent forwarding
should be enabled with caution. Users with the ability to bypass
file permissions on the remote host (for the agent's socket) can
access the local agent through the forwarded connection. An at‐
tacker cannot obtain key material from the agent, however they
can perform operations on the keys that enable them to authenti‐
cate using the identities loaded into the agent. A safer alter‐
native may be to use a jump host (see Disables forwarding of the
authentication agent connection. Bind to the address of before
attempting to connect to the destination host. This is only use‐
ful on systems with more than one address. Use on the local ma‐
chine as the source address of the connection. Only useful on
systems with more than one address. Requests compression of all
data (including stdin, stdout, stderr, and data for forwarded
X11, TCP and connections). The compression algorithm is the same
used by Compression is desirable on modem lines and other slow
connections, but will only slow down things on fast networks.
The default value can be set on a host-by-host basis in the con‐
figuration files; see the option in Selects the cipher specifica‐
tion for encrypting the session. is a comma-separated list of
ciphers listed in order of preference. See the keyword in for
more information. Specifies a local application-level port for‐
warding. This works by allocating a socket to listen to on the
local side, optionally bound to the specified Whenever a connec‐
tion is made to this port, the connection is forwarded over the
secure channel, and the application protocol is then used to de‐
termine where to connect to from the remote machine. Currently
the SOCKS4 and SOCKS5 protocols are supported, and will act as a
SOCKS server. Only root can forward privileged ports. Dynamic
port forwardings can also be specified in the configuration file.
IPv6 addresses can be specified by enclosing the address in
square brackets. Only the superuser can forward privileged
ports. By default, the local port is bound in accordance with
the setting. However, an explicit may be used to bind the con‐
nection to a specific address. The of indicates that the listen‐
ing port be bound for local use only, while an empty address or
indicates that the port should be available from all interfaces.
Append debug logs to instead of standard error. Sets the escape
character for sessions with a pty (default: The escape character
is only recognized at the beginning of a line. The escape char‐
acter followed by a dot closes the connection; followed by con‐
trol-Z suspends the connection; and followed by itself sends the
escape character once. Setting the character to disables any es‐
capes and makes the session fully transparent. Specifies an al‐
ternative per-user configuration file. If a configuration file
is given on the command line, the system-wide configuration file
will be ignored. The default for the per-user configuration file
is If set to no configuration files will be read. Requests to go
to background just before command execution. This is useful if
is going to ask for passwords or passphrases, but the user wants
it in the background. This implies The recommended way to start
X11 programs at a remote site is with something like If the con‐
figuration option is set to then a client started with will wait
for all remote port forwards to be successfully established be‐
fore placing itself in the background. Refer to the description
of in for details. Causes to print its configuration after eval‐
uating and blocks and exit. Allows remote hosts to connect to
local forwarded ports. If used on a multiplexed connection, then
this option must be specified on the master process. Specify the
PKCS#11 shared library should use to communicate with a PKCS#11
token providing keys for user authentication. Selects a file
from which the identity (private key) for public key authentica‐
tion is read. You can also specify a public key file to use the
corresponding private key that is loaded in when the private key
file is not present locally. The default is and Identity files
may also be specified on a per-host basis in the configuration
file. It is possible to have multiple options (and multiple
identities specified in configuration files). If no certificates
have been explicitly specified by the directive, will also try to
load certificate information from the filename obtained by ap‐
pending to identity filenames. Connect to the target host by
first making an connection to the jump host described by and then
establishing a TCP forwarding to the ultimate destination from
there. Multiple jump hops may be specified separated by comma
characters. IPv6 addresses can be specified by enclosing the ad‐
dress in square brackets. This is a shortcut to specify a con‐
figuration directive. Note that configuration directives sup‐
plied on the command-line generally apply to the destination host
and not any specified jump hosts. Use to specify configuration
for jump hosts. Enables GSSAPI-based authentication and forward‐
ing (delegation) of GSSAPI credentials to the server. Disables
forwarding (delegation) of GSSAPI credentials to the server.
Specifies that connections to the given TCP port or Unix socket
on the local (client) host are to be forwarded to the given host
and port, or Unix socket, on the remote side. This works by al‐
locating a socket to listen to either a TCP on the local side,
optionally bound to the specified or to a Unix socket. Whenever
a connection is made to the local port or socket, the connection
is forwarded over the secure channel, and a connection is made to
either port or the Unix socket from the remote machine. Port
forwardings can also be specified in the configuration file.
Only the superuser can forward privileged ports. IPv6 addresses
can be specified by enclosing the address in square brackets. By
default, the local port is bound in accordance with the setting.
However, an explicit may be used to bind the connection to a spe‐
cific address. The of indicates that the listening port be bound
for local use only, while an empty address or indicates that the
port should be available from all interfaces. Specifies the user
to log in as on the remote machine. This also may be specified
on a per-host basis in the configuration file. Places the client
into mode for connection sharing. Multiple options places into
mode but with confirmation required using before each operation
that changes the multiplexing state (e.g. opening a new session).
Refer to the description of in for details. A comma-separated
list of MAC (message authentication code) algorithms, specified
in order of preference. See the keyword in for more information.
Do not execute a remote command. This is useful for just for‐
warding ports. Refer to the description of in for details.
Redirects stdin from (actually, prevents reading from stdin).
This must be used when is run in the background. A common trick
is to use this to run X11 programs on a remote machine. For ex‐
ample, will start an emacs on shadows.cs.hut.fi, and the X11 con‐
nection will be automatically forwarded over an encrypted chan‐
nel. The program will be put in the background. (This does not
work if needs to ask for a password or passphrase; see also the
option.) Refer to the description of in for details. Control an
active connection multiplexing master process. When the option
is specified, the argument is interpreted and passed to the mas‐
ter process. Valid commands are: (check that the master process
is running), (request forwardings without command execution),
(cancel forwardings), (connect to a running multiplexing master
in proxy mode), (request the master to exit), and (request the
master to stop accepting further multiplexing requests). Can be
used to give options in the format used in the configuration
file. This is useful for specifying options for which there is
no separate command-line flag. For full details of the options
listed below, and their possible values, see Specify a tag name
that may be used to select configuration in Refer to the and key‐
words in for more information. Port to connect to on the remote
host. This can be specified on a per-host basis in the configu‐
ration file. Queries for the algorithms supported by one of the
following features: (supported symmetric ciphers), (supported
symmetric ciphers that support authenticated encryption), (sup‐
ported query terms for use with the flag), (supported message in‐
tegrity codes), (key exchange algorithms), (GSSAPI key exchange
algorithms), (key types), (valid CA signature algorithms for cer‐
tificates), (certificate key types), (non-certificate key types),
(all key types and signature algorithms), (supported SSH protocol
versions), and (supported signature algorithms). Alternatively,
any keyword from or that takes an algorithm list may be used as
an alias for the corresponding query_option. Quiet mode. Causes
most warning and diagnostic messages to be suppressed. Specifies
that connections to the given TCP port or Unix socket on the re‐
mote (server) host are to be forwarded to the local side. This
works by allocating a socket to listen to either a TCP or to a
Unix socket on the remote side. Whenever a connection is made to
this port or Unix socket, the connection is forwarded over the
secure channel, and a connection is made from the local machine
to either an explicit destination specified by port or or, if no
explicit destination was specified, will act as a SOCKS 4/5 proxy
and forward connections to the destinations requested by the re‐
mote SOCKS client. Port forwardings can also be specified in the
configuration file. Privileged ports can be forwarded only when
logging in as root on the remote machine. IPv6 addresses can be
specified by enclosing the address in square brackets. By de‐
fault, TCP listening sockets on the server will be bound to the
loopback interface only. This may be overridden by specifying a
An empty or the address indicates that the remote socket should
listen on all interfaces. Specifying a remote will only succeed
if the server's option is enabled (see If the argument is the
listen port will be dynamically allocated on the server and re‐
ported to the client at run time. When used together with the
allocated port will be printed to the standard output. Specifies
the location of a control socket for connection sharing, or the
string to disable connection sharing. Refer to the description
of and in for details. May be used to request invocation of a
subsystem on the remote system. Subsystems facilitate the use of
SSH as a secure transport for other applications (e.g. The sub‐
system is specified as the remote command. Refer to the descrip‐
tion of in for details. Disable pseudo-terminal allocation.
Force pseudo-terminal allocation. This can be used to execute
arbitrary screen-based programs on a remote machine, which can be
very useful, e.g. when implementing menu services. Multiple op‐
tions force tty allocation, even if has no local tty. Display
the version number and exit. Verbose mode. Causes to print de‐
bugging messages about its progress. This is helpful in debug‐
ging connection, authentication, and configuration problems.
Multiple options increase the verbosity. The maximum is 3. Re‐
quests that standard input and output on the client be forwarded
to on over the secure channel. Implies and though these can be
overridden in the configuration file or using command line op‐
tions. Requests tunnel device forwarding with the specified de‐
vices between the client and the server The devices may be speci‐
fied by numerical ID or the keyword which uses the next available
tunnel device. If is not specified, it defaults to See also the
and directives in If the directive is unset, it will be set to
the default tunnel mode, which is If a different forwarding mode
it desired, then it should be specified before Enables X11 for‐
warding. This can also be specified on a per-host basis in a
configuration file. X11 forwarding should be enabled with cau‐
tion. Users with the ability to bypass file permissions on the
remote host (for the user's X authorization database) can access
the local X11 display through the forwarded connection. An at‐
tacker may then be able to perform activities such as keystroke
monitoring. For this reason, X11 forwarding is subjected to X11
SECURITY extension restrictions by default. Refer to the option
and the directive in for more information. Disables X11 forward‐
ing. Enables trusted X11 forwarding. Trusted X11 forwardings
are not subjected to the X11 SECURITY extension controls. Send
log information using the system module. By default this infor‐
mation is sent to stderr. may additionally obtain configuration
data from a per-user configuration file and a system-wide config‐
uration file. The file format and configuration options are de‐
scribed in The OpenSSH SSH client supports SSH protocol 2. The
methods available for authentication are: GSSAPI-based authenti‐
cation, host-based authentication, public key authentication,
keyboard-interactive authentication, and password authentication.
Authentication methods are tried in the order specified above,
though can be used to change the default order. Host-based au‐
thentication works as follows: If the machine the user logs in
from is listed in or on the remote machine, the user is non-root
and the user names are the same on both sides, or if the files or
exist in the user's home directory on the remote machine and con‐
tain a line containing the name of the client machine and the
name of the user on that machine, the user is considered for lo‐
gin. Additionally, the server be able to verify the client's
host key (see the description of and below) for login to be per‐
mitted. This authentication method closes security holes due to
IP spoofing, DNS spoofing, and routing spoofing. [Note to the
administrator: and the rlogin/rsh protocol in general, are inher‐
ently insecure and should be disabled if security is desired.]
Public key authentication works as follows: The scheme is based
on public-key cryptography, using cryptosystems where encryption
and decryption are done using separate keys, and it is unfeasible
to derive the decryption key from the encryption key. The idea
is that each user creates a public/private key pair for authenti‐
cation purposes. The server knows the public key, and only the
user knows the private key. implements public key authentication
protocol automatically, using one of the ECDSA, Ed25519 or RSA
algorithms. The file lists the public keys that are permitted
for logging in. When the user logs in, the program tells the
server which key pair it would like to use for authentication.
The client proves that it has access to the private key and the
server checks that the corresponding public key is authorized to
accept the account. The server may inform the client of errors
that prevented public key authentication from succeeding after
authentication completes using a different method. These may be
viewed by increasing the to or higher (e.g. by using the flag).
The user creates their key pair by running This stores the pri‐
vate key in (ECDSA), (Ed25519), or (RSA) and stores the public
key in (ECDSA), (Ed25519), or (RSA) in the user's home directory.
The user should then copy the public key to in their home direc‐
tory on the remote machine. The file corresponds to the conven‐
tional file, and has one key per line, though the lines can be
very long. After this, the user can log in without giving the
password. A variation on public key authentication is available
in the form of certificate authentication: instead of a set of
public/private keys, signed certificates are used. This has the
advantage that a single trusted certification authority can be
used in place of many public/private keys. See the CERTIFICATES
section of for more information. The most convenient way to use
public key or certificate authentication may be with an authenti‐
cation agent. See and (optionally) the directive in for more in‐
formation. Keyboard-interactive authentication works as follows:
The server sends an arbitrary text and prompts for a response,
possibly multiple times. Examples of keyboard-interactive au‐
thentication include Authentication (see and PAM (some systems).
Finally, if other authentication methods fail, prompts the user
for a password. The password is sent to the remote host for
checking; however, since all communications are encrypted, the
password cannot be seen by someone listening on the network. au‐
tomatically maintains and checks a database containing identifi‐
cation for all hosts it has ever been used with. Host keys are
stored in in the user's home directory. Additionally, the file
is automatically checked for known hosts. Any new hosts are au‐
tomatically added to the user's file. If a host's identification
ever changes, warns about this and disables password authentica‐
tion to prevent server spoofing or man-in-the-middle attacks,
which could otherwise be used to circumvent the encryption. The
option can be used to control logins to machines whose host key
is not known or has changed. When the user's identity has been
accepted by the server, the server either executes the given com‐
mand in a non-interactive session or, if no command has been
specified, logs into the machine and gives the user a normal
shell as an interactive session. All communication with the re‐
mote command or shell will be automatically encrypted. If an in‐
teractive session is requested, by default will only request a
pseudo-terminal (pty) for interactive sessions when the client
has one. The flags and can be used to override this behaviour.
If a pseudo-terminal has been allocated, the user may use the es‐
cape characters noted below. If no pseudo-terminal has been al‐
located, the session is transparent and can be used to reliably
transfer binary data. On most systems, setting the escape char‐
acter to will also make the session transparent even if a tty is
used. The session terminates when the command or shell on the
remote machine exits and all X11 and TCP connections have been
closed. When a pseudo-terminal has been requested, supports a
number of functions through the use of an escape character. A
single tilde character can be sent as or by following the tilde
by a character other than those described below. The escape
character must always follow a newline to be interpreted as spe‐
cial. The escape character can be changed in configuration files
using the configuration directive or on the command line by the
option. The supported escapes (assuming the default are: Discon‐
nect. Background List forwarded connections. Background at lo‐
gout when waiting for forwarded connection / X11 sessions to ter‐
minate. Display a list of escape characters. Send a BREAK to
the remote system (only useful if the peer supports it). Open
command line. Currently this allows the addition of port for‐
wardings using the and options (see above). It also allows the
cancellation of existing port-forwardings with for local, for re‐
mote and for dynamic port-forwardings. allows the user to exe‐
cute a local command if the option is enabled in Basic help is
available, using the option. Request rekeying of the connection
(only useful if the peer supports it). Decrease the verbosity
when errors are being written to stderr. Increase the verbosity
when errors are being written to stderr. Forwarding of arbitrary
TCP connections over a secure channel can be specified either on
the command line or in a configuration file. One possible appli‐
cation of TCP forwarding is a secure connection to a mail server;
another is going through firewalls. In the example below, we
look at encrypting communication for an IRC client, even though
the IRC server it connects to does not directly support encrypted
communication. This works as follows: the user connects to the
remote host using specifying the ports to be used to forward the
connection. After that it is possible to start the program lo‐
cally, and will encrypt and forward the connection to the remote
server. The following example tunnels an IRC session from the
client to an IRC server at joining channel nickname using the
standard IRC port, 6667: $ ssh -f -L 6667:localhost:6667
server.example.com sleep 10 $ irc -c '#users' pinky IRC/127.0.0.1
The option backgrounds and the remote command is specified to al‐
low an amount of time (10 seconds, in the example) to start the
program which is going to use the tunnel. If no connections are
made within the time specified, will exit. If the variable is
set to (or see the description of the and options above) and the
user is using X11 (the environment variable is set), the connec‐
tion to the X11 display is automatically forwarded to the remote
side in such a way that any X11 programs started from the shell
(or command) will go through the encrypted channel, and the con‐
nection to the real X server will be made from the local machine.
The user should not manually set Forwarding of X11 connections
can be configured on the command line or in configuration files.
The value set by will point to the server machine, but with a
display number greater than zero. This is normal, and happens
because creates a X server on the server machine for forwarding
the connections over the encrypted channel. will also automati‐
cally set up Xauthority data on the server machine. For this
purpose, it will generate a random authorization cookie, store it
in Xauthority on the server, and verify that any forwarded con‐
nections carry this cookie and replace it by the real cookie when
the connection is opened. The real authentication cookie is
never sent to the server machine (and no cookies are sent in the
plain). If the variable is set to (or see the description of the
and options above) and the user is using an authentication agent,
the connection to the agent is automatically forwarded to the re‐
mote side. When connecting to a server for the first time, a
fingerprint of the server's public key is presented to the user
(unless the option has been disabled). Fingerprints can be de‐
termined using If the fingerprint is already known, it can be
matched and the key can be accepted or rejected. If only legacy
(MD5) fingerprints for the server are available, the option may
be used to downgrade the fingerprint algorithm to match. Because
of the difficulty of comparing host keys just by looking at fin‐
gerprint strings, there is also support to compare host keys vi‐
sually, using By setting the option to a small ASCII graphic gets
displayed on every login to a server, no matter if the session
itself is interactive or not. By learning the pattern a known
server produces, a user can easily find out that the host key has
changed when a completely different pattern is displayed. Be‐
cause these patterns are not unambiguous however, a pattern that
looks similar to the pattern remembered only gives a good proba‐
bility that the host key is the same, not guaranteed proof. To
get a listing of the fingerprints along with their random art for
all known hosts, the following command line can be used: If the
fingerprint is unknown, an alternative method of verification is
available: SSH fingerprints verified by DNS. An additional re‐
source record (RR), SSHFP, is added to a zonefile and the con‐
necting client is able to match the fingerprint with that of the
key presented. In this example, we are connecting a client to a
server, The SSHFP resource records should first be added to the
zonefile for host.example.com: $ ssh-keygen -r host.example.com.
The output lines will have to be added to the zonefile. To check
that the zone is answering fingerprint queries: Finally the
client connects: $ ssh -o "VerifyHostKeyDNS ask" host.example.com
[...] Matching host key fingerprint found in DNS. Are you sure
you want to continue connecting (yes/no)? See the option in for
more information. contains support for Virtual Private Network
(VPN) tunnelling using the network pseudo-device, allowing two
networks to be joined securely. The configuration option con‐
trols whether the server supports this, and at what level (layer
2 or 3 traffic). The following example would connect client net‐
work 10.0.50.0/24 with remote network 10.0.99.0/24 using a point-
to-point connection from 10.1.1.1 to 10.1.1.2, provided that the
SSH server running on the gateway to the remote network, at
192.168.1.15, allows it. On the client: # ssh -f -w 0:1
192.168.1.15 true # ifconfig tun0 10.1.1.1 10.1.1.2 netmask
255.255.255.252 # route add 10.0.99.0/24 10.1.1.2 On the server:
# ifconfig tun1 10.1.1.2 10.1.1.1 netmask 255.255.255.252 # route
add 10.0.50.0/24 10.1.1.1 Client access may be more finely tuned
via the file (see below) and the server option. The following
entry would permit connections on device 1 from user and on tun
device 2 from user if is set to tunnel="1",command="sh /etc/net‐
start tun1" ssh-rsa ... jane tunnel="2",command="sh /etc/netstart
tun2" ssh-rsa ... john Since an SSH-based setup entails a fair
amount of overhead, it may be more suited to temporary setups,
such as for wireless VPNs. More permanent VPNs are better pro‐
vided by tools such as and will normally set the following envi‐
ronment variables: The variable indicates the location of the X11
server. It is automatically set by to point to a value of the
form where indicates the host where the shell runs, and is an in‐
teger 1. uses this special value to forward X11 connections
over the secure channel. The user should normally not set ex‐
plicitly, as that will render the X11 connection insecure (and
will require the user to manually copy any required authorization
cookies). Set to the path of the user's home directory. Synonym
for set for compatibility with systems that use this variable.
Set to the path of the user's mailbox. Set to the default as
specified when compiling If needs a passphrase, it will read the
passphrase from the current terminal if it was run from a termi‐
nal. If does not have a terminal associated with it but and are
set, it will execute the program specified by and open an X11
window to read the passphrase. This is particularly useful when
calling from a or related script. (Note that on some machines it
may be necessary to redirect the input from to make this work.)
Allows further control over the use of an askpass program. If
this variable is set to then will never attempt to use one. If
it is set to then will prefer to use the askpass program instead
of the TTY when requesting passwords. Finally, if the variable
is set to then the askpass program will be used for all
passphrase input regardless of whether is set. Identifies the
path of a socket used to communicate with the agent. Identifies
the client and server ends of the connection. The variable con‐
tains four space-separated values: client IP address, client port
number, server IP address, and server port number. This variable
contains the original command line if a forced command is exe‐
cuted. It can be used to extract the original arguments. This
is set to the name of the tty (path to the device) associated
with the current shell or command. If the current session has no
tty, this variable is not set. Optionally set by to contain the
interface names assigned if tunnel forwarding was requested by
the client. Optionally set by this variable may contain a path‐
name to a file that lists the authentication methods successfully
used when the session was established, including any public keys
that were used. This variable is set to indicate the present
time zone if it was set when the daemon was started (i.e. the
daemon passes the value on to new connections). Set to the name
of the user logging in. Additionally, reads and adds lines of
the format to the environment if the file exists and users are
allowed to change their environment. For more information, see
the option in This file is used for host-based authentication
(see above). On some machines this file may need to be world-
readable if the user's home directory is on an NFS partition, be‐
cause reads it as root. Additionally, this file must be owned by
the user, and must not have write permissions for anyone else.
The recommended permission for most machines is read/write for
the user, and not accessible by others. This file is used in ex‐
actly the same way as but allows host-based authentication with‐
out permitting login with rlogin/rsh. This directory is the de‐
fault location for all user-specific configuration and authenti‐
cation information. There is no general requirement to keep the
entire contents of this directory secret, but the recommended
permissions are read/write/execute for the user, and not accessi‐
ble by others. Lists the public keys (ECDSA, Ed25519, RSA) that
can be used for logging in as this user. The format of this file
is described in the manual page. This file is not highly sensi‐
tive, but the recommended permissions are read/write for the
user, and not accessible by others. This is the per-user config‐
uration file. The file format and configuration options are de‐
scribed in Because of the potential for abuse, this file must
have strict permissions: read/write for the user, and not
writable by others. Contains additional definitions for environ‐
ment variables; see above. Contains the private key for authen‐
tication. These files contain sensitive data and should be read‐
able by the user but not accessible by others (read/write/exe‐
cute). will simply ignore a private key file if it is accessible
by others. It is possible to specify a passphrase when generat‐
ing the key which will be used to encrypt the sensitive part of
this file using AES-128. Contains the public key for authentica‐
tion. These files are not sensitive and can (but need not) be
readable by anyone. Contains a list of host keys for all hosts
the user has logged into that are not already in the systemwide
list of known host keys. See for further details of the format
of this file. Commands in this file are executed by when the
user logs in, just before the user's shell (or command) is
started. See the manual page for more information. This file is
for host-based authentication (see above). It should only be
writable by root. This file is used in exactly the same way as
but allows host-based authentication without permitting login
with rlogin/rsh. Systemwide configuration file. The file format
and configuration options are described in These files contain
the private parts of the host keys and are used for host-based
authentication. Systemwide list of known host keys. This file
should be prepared by the system administrator to contain the
public host keys of all machines in the organization. It should
be world-readable. See for further details of the format of this
file. Commands in this file are executed by when the user logs
in, just before the user's shell (or command) is started. See
the manual page for more information. exits with the exit status
of the remote command or with 255 if an error occurred.
See for descriptions of the following attributes:
box; cbp-1 | cbp-1 l | l . ATTRIBUTE TYPE ATTRIBUTE VALUE =
Availability network/ssh = Stability Pass-through uncom‐
mitted OpenSSH is a derivative of the original and free ssh
1.2.12 release by Tatu Ylonen. Aaron Campbell, Bob Beck, Markus
Friedl, Niels Provos, Theo de Raadt and Dug Song removed many
bugs, re-added newer features and created OpenSSH. Markus Friedl
contributed the support for SSH protocol versions 1.5 and 2.0.
Source code for open source software components in Oracle Solaris
can be found at https://www.oracle.com/downloads/opensource/so‐
laris-source-code-downloads.html.
This software was built from source available at:
https://github.com/oracle/solaris-userland
The original community source was downloaded from:
https://mir‐
rors.sonic.net/pub/OpenBSD/OpenSSH/portable/openssh-10.2p1.tar.gz
Further information about this software can be found on the open
source community website at https://www.openssh.com/.