개요

• 솔라나라에 설명된 어플리케이션에 대해 맨 페이지를 찾아 출력한다.
• MAN 페이지에 대한 설명은 윈디하나의 솔라나라: MAN 페이지을 참고하자.
• svcadm(8)을 검색하려면 섹션에서 8 을 선택하고, 맨 페이지 이름에 svcadm을 입력하고 검색을 누른다.

mac_seeotheruids(4)

MAC_SEEOTHERUIDS(4)      BSD Kernel Interfaces Manual      MAC_SEEOTHERUIDS(4)

NAME
     mac_seeotheruids — simple policy controlling whether users see other
     users

SYNOPSIS
     To compile the policy into your kernel, place the following lines in your
     kernel configuration file:

           options MAC
           options MAC_SEEOTHERUIDS

     Alternately, to load the module at boot time, place the following line in
     your kernel configuration file:

           options MAC

     and in loader.conf(5):

           mac_seeotheruids_load="YES"

DESCRIPTION
     The mac_seeotheruids policy module, when enabled, denies users to see
     processes or sockets owned by other users.

     To enable mac_seeotheruids, set the sysctl OID
     security.mac.seeotheruids.enabled to 1.  To permit superuser awareness of
     other credentials by virtue of privilege, set the sysctl OID
     security.mac.seeotheruids.suser_privileged to 1.

     To allow users to see processes and sockets owned by the same primary
     group, set the sysctl OID security.mac.seeotheruids.primarygroup_enabled
     to 1.

     To allow processes with a specific group ID to be exempt from the policy,
     set the sysctl OID security.mac.seeotheruids.specificgid_enabled to 1,
     and security.mac.seeotheruids.specificgid to the group ID to be exempted.

   Label Format
     No labels are defined for mac_seeotheruids.

SEE ALSO
     mac(4), mac_biba(4), mac_bsdextended(4), mac_ifoff(4), mac_lomac(4),
     mac_mls(4), mac_none(4), mac_partition(4), mac_portacl(4), mac_test(4),
     mac(9)

HISTORY
     The mac_seeotheruids policy module first appeared in FreeBSD 5.0 and was
     developed by the TrustedBSD Project.

AUTHORS
     This software was contributed to the FreeBSD Project by Network Asso‐
     ciates Labs, the Security Research Division of Network Associates Inc.
     under DARPA/SPAWAR contract N66001-01-C-8035 (“CBOSS”), as part of the
     DARPA CHATS research program.

BUGS
     While the MAC Framework design is intended to support the containment of
     the root user, not all attack channels are currently protected by entry
     point checks.  As such, MAC Framework policies should not be relied on,
     in isolation, to protect against a malicious privileged user.

BSD                              July 25, 2015                             BSD