개요

• 솔라나라에 설명된 어플리케이션에 대해 맨 페이지를 찾아 출력한다.
• MAN 페이지에 대한 설명은 윈디하나의 솔라나라: MAN 페이지을 참고하자.
• svcadm(8)을 검색하려면 섹션에서 8 을 선택하고, 맨 페이지 이름에 svcadm을 입력하고 검색을 누른다.

mac_partition(4)

MAC_PARTITION(4)         BSD Kernel Interfaces Manual         MAC_PARTITION(4)

NAME
     mac_partition — process partition policy

SYNOPSIS
     To compile the process partition policy into your kernel, place the fol‐
     lowing lines in your kernel configuration file:

           options MAC
           options MAC_PARTITION

     Alternately, to load the process partition module at boot time, place the
     following line in your kernel configuration file:

           options MAC

     and in loader.conf(5):

           mac_partition_load="YES"

DESCRIPTION
     The mac_partition policy module implements a process partition policy,
     which allows administrators to place running processes into “partitions”,
     based on their numeric process partition (specified in the process's MAC
     label).  Processes with a specified partition can only see processes that
     are in the same partition.  If no partition is specified for a process,
     it can see all other processes in the system (subject to other MAC policy
     restrictions not defined in this man page).  No provisions for placing
     processes into multiple partitions are available.

   Label Format
     Partition labels take on the following format:

           partition/value

     Where value can be any integer value or “none”.  For example:

           partition/1
           partition/20
           partition/none

SEE ALSO
     mac(4), mac_biba(4), mac_bsdextended(4), mac_ifoff(4), mac_lomac(4),
     mac_mls(4), mac_none(4), mac_portacl(4), mac_seeotheruids(4),
     mac_test(4), maclabel(7), mac(9)

HISTORY
     The mac_partition policy module first appeared in FreeBSD 5.0 and was
     developed by the TrustedBSD Project.

AUTHORS
     This software was contributed to the FreeBSD Project by Network Asso‐
     ciates Labs, the Security Research Division of Network Associates Inc.
     under DARPA/SPAWAR contract N66001-01-C-8035 (“CBOSS”), as part of the
     DARPA CHATS research program.

BUGS
     While the MAC Framework design is intended to support the containment of
     the root user, not all attack channels are currently protected by entry
     point checks.  As such, MAC Framework policies should not be relied on,
     in isolation, to protect against a malicious privileged user.

BSD                              July 25, 2015                             BSD