svcadm(8)을 검색하려면 섹션에서 8 을 선택하고, 맨 페이지 이름에 svcadm을 입력하고 검색을 누른다.
labels(7)
la...s(7)Standards, Environments, Macros, Character Sets, and miscellanlya...s(7)
NAME
labels - Solaris label attributes
DESCRIPTION
Labels are attributes that are used in mandatory policy decisions. La‐
bels are associated, either explicitly or implicitly, with all subjects
(generally processes) and objects (generally things with data such as
files) that are accessible to subjects. The default mandatory policy
labels are defined by a site's security administrator in label_encod‐
ings(5).
Mandatory Policy
Two labels are always defined: admin_low and admin_high. The site's se‐
curity administrator defines all other labels in label_encodings(5) man
page.
Solaris Mandatory Policy
The default mandatory policy for Solaris applies to processes and
filesystem objects. By default, all processes are started with a clear‐
ance of admin_high, and all files are implicitly labeled admin_low. The
MAC policy for reading and writing is that the subject clearance must
dominate the label of the object. Dominance is also required to trace
another process or view its attributes. Operations that modify the ker‐
nel such as loading modules or using the modular debugger on a live
kernel require that the process has a clearance of admin_high.
Processes may lower their own clearance, but not raise it. Typically
the clearance for a user session is set by pam_setcred(3PAM). Users can
also lower the clearance of applications using the sandbox command.
Authorized users may set the label of files to which they have write
access, to labels dominated by their clearance. Newly created files are
automatically labeled with the label of their parent directory. Addi‐
tional restrictions are described in setflabel(3TSOL).
Trusted Extensions Mandatory Policy
The default mandatory policy of Trusted Extensions is a Mandatory Ac‐
cess Control (MAC) policy that is equivalent to that of the Bell-La‐
Padula Model of the Lattice, the Simple Security Property, and the
*-Property (Star Property), with restricted write up. The default
mandatory policy is also equivalent to the Goguen and Mesegeur model of
Non-Interference.
Admin_low is associated with all normal user readable (viewable)
Trusted Extensions objects. admin_high is associated with all other
Trusted Extensions objects. Only administrative users have MAC read
(view) access to admin_high objects and only administrative users have
MAC write (modify) access to admin_low objects or admin_high objects.
Human Readable Labels
Users interact with labels as strings. Graphical user interfaces and
command line interfaces present the strings as defined in label_encod‐
ings(5). Human readable labels are classified at the label that they
represent. Thus the string for a label A is only readable (viewable,
translatable to or from human readable to opaque m_label_t) by a sub‐
ject whose label allows read (view) access to that label.
Internal Text Labels
In order to store labels in publicly accessible (admin_low) name ser‐
vice databases, an unclassified internal text form is used. This tex‐
tual form is not intended to be used in any interfaces other than those
that are provided with the Trusted Extensions software release that
created this textual form of the label.
Labels and Applications
Applications interact with labels as opaque (m_label_t) structures. The
semantics of these opaque structures are defined by a string to m_la‐
bel_t translation. This translation is defined in label_encodings(5).
Various Application Programming Interfaces (API) translate between
strings and m_label_t structures. Various APIs test access of subject-
related labels to object-related labels.
ATTRIBUTES
See attributes(7) for description of the following attributes:
tab() box; cw(2.75i) |cw(2.75i) lw(2.75i) |lw(2.75i) ATTRIBUTE TYPEAT‐
TRIBUTE VALUE _ Interface StabilitySee below
The labels implementation is Committed for systems that implement the
Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) MAC policy of label_encodings(5).
Other policies might exist in a future release of Trusted Extensions
that might make obsolete or supplement label_encodings.
Internal text labels are Not-an-Interface and might change with any re‐
lease of Trusted Extensions. They are intended only for input and gen‐
eration on the same release of Trusted Extensions software.
As a potential porting aid for Trusted Solaris 8 applications, the
opaque structure names bslabel_t, blevel_t, and bclear_t are defined to
be equivalent to m_label_t. Like m_label_t, these types must be ported
as opaque pointers. The same must be done with the various Trusted So‐
laris 8 label interfaces. These Trusted Solaris 8 structures and inter‐
faces are Obsolete and might be removed from a future release of
Trusted Extensions.
SEE ALSO
plabel(1), blcompare(3TSOL), label_to_str(3TSOL), m_label_alloc(3TSOL),
m_label_dup(3TSOL), m_label_free(3TSOL), str_to_label(3TSOL), label_en‐
codings(5), attributes(7), clearance(7), chk_encodings(8)
Bell, D. E., and LaPadula, L. J. Secure Computer Systems: Unified Expo‐
sition and Multics Interpretation, MTR-2997 Rev. 2, MITRE Corp., Bed‐
ford Mass., March 1976. NTIS AD-A023 588/7.
Goguen, J. A., and Mesegeur, J.: Security Policies and Security Models,
Proceedings 1982 Symposium on Security and Privacy, IEEE Computer Soci‐
ety Press, 1982, p 11-20.
Goguen, J. A., and Mesegeur, J.: Unwinding and Interference Control,
Proceedings 1984 Symposium on Security and Privacy, IEEE Computer Soci‐
ety Press, 1984, p 75-86.
Compartmented Mode Workstation Labeling: Encodings Format
Trusted Extensions Configuration and Administration
Oracle Solaris 11.4 21 Jun 2021 la...s(7)