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bzero(3)

BZERO(3)                   Linux Programmer's Manual                  BZERO(3)

NAME
       bzero, explicit_bzero - zero a byte string

SYNOPSIS
       #include <strings.h>

       void bzero(void *s, size_t n);

       #include <string.h>

       void explicit_bzero(void *s, size_t n);

DESCRIPTION
       The  bzero()  function  erases  the  data  in the n bytes of the memory
       starting at the location pointed to by s, by writing zeros (bytes  con‐
       taining '\0') to that area.

       The  explicit_bzero()  function  performs the same task as bzero().  It
       differs from bzero() in that it guarantees that compiler  optimizations
       will  not  remove  the erase operation if the compiler deduces that the
       operation is "unnecessary".

RETURN VALUE
       None.

VERSIONS
       explicit_bzero() first appeared in glibc 2.25.

ATTRIBUTES
       For an explanation of the terms  used  in  this  section,  see  attrib‐
       utes(7).   allbox;  lb  lb  lb  l  l  l.   Interface Attribute Value T{
       bzero(),
       explicit_bzero() T}   Thread safety  MT-Safe

CONFORMING TO
       The bzero() function is deprecated (marked as LEGACY in  POSIX.1-2001);
       use  memset(3) in new programs.  POSIX.1-2008 removes the specification
       of bzero().  The bzero() function first appeared in 4.3BSD.

       The explicit_bzero() function is a nonstandard extension that  is  also
       present on some of the BSDs.  Some other implementations have a similar
       function, such as memset_explicit() or memset_s().

NOTES
       The  explicit_bzero()  function  addresses a problem that security-con‐
       scious applications may run into when using bzero():  if  the  compiler
       can deduce that the location to zeroed will never again be touched by a
       correct  program, then it may remove the bzero() call altogether.  This
       is a problem if the intent of the bzero() call was to  erase  sensitive
       data  (e.g.,  passwords)  to  prevent the possibility that the data was
       leaked  by  an  incorrect  or  compromised  program.   Calls   to   ex‐
       plicit_bzero() are never optimized away by the compiler.

       The  explicit_bzero()  function  does not solve all problems associated
       with erasing sensitive data:

       1. The explicit_bzero() function does not guarantee that sensitive data
          is completely erased from memory.  (The same is  true  of  bzero().)
          For example, there may be copies of the sensitive data in a register
          and  in "scratch" stack areas.  The explicit_bzero() function is not
          aware of these copies, and can't erase them.

       2. In some circumstances, explicit_bzero() can decrease  security.   If
          the  compiler  determined that the variable containing the sensitive
          data could be optimized to be stored in a register  (because  it  is
          small  enough  to fit in a register, and no operation other than the
          explicit_bzero() call would need to take the address  of  the  vari‐
          able),  then  the  explicit_bzero()  call  will force the data to be
          copied from the register to a location in RAM that is  then  immedi‐
          ately  erased  (while  the copy in the register remains unaffected).
          The problem here is that data in RAM is more likely to be exposed by
          a bug than data in a register, and thus  the  explicit_bzero()  call
          creates a brief time window where the sensitive data is more vulner‐
          able  than  it would otherwise have been if no attempt had been made
          to erase the data.

       Note that declaring the sensitive variable with the volatile  qualifier
       does  not  eliminate  the  above  problems.   Indeed, it will make them
       worse, since, for example, it may force a variable that would otherwise
       have been optimized into a register to instead be maintained  in  (more
       vulnerable) RAM for its entire lifetime.

       Notwithstanding the above details, for security-conscious applications,
       using  explicit_bzero()  is  generally preferable to not using it.  The
       developers of explicit_bzero() anticipate that  future  compilers  will
       recognize  calls  to explicit_bzero() and take steps to ensure that all
       copies of the sensitive data are erased, including copies in  registers
       or in "scratch" stack areas.

SEE ALSO
       bstring(3), memset(3), swab(3)

COLOPHON
       This  page  is  part of release 5.02 of the Linux man-pages project.  A
       description of the project, information about reporting bugs,  and  the
       latest     version     of     this    page,    can    be    found    at
       https://www.kernel.org/doc/man-pages/.

Linux                             2019-03-06                          BZERO(3)
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